Object-based security system
专利汇可以提供Object-based security system专利检索，专利查询，专利分析的服务。并且The invention authenticates processes and inter-process messaging. In some examples of the invention, security is performed in three layers—the application layer, the middleware layer, and the transport layer. Some examples of the invention include software products. One software product comprises security software and middleware software stored on a software storage medium. The security software directs a processor to receive a log-in request for a process, generate a request to authenticate the process, transfer the request to authenticate the process, receive a security association for the process, and transfer the security association. The middleware software directs the processor to receive the security association from the security software, receive a message from the process, insert the security association into the message, and transfer the message. Another software product comprises security software stored on a software storage medium. The security software directs a processor to receive a request to authenticate a process, authenticate the process, generate a security association for the process, store the security association, transfer the security association, receive the security association extracted from a message, and check the security association extracted from the message with the stored security association to authenticate the message.，下面是Object-based security system专利的具体信息内容。
What is claimed is:1. A software product for secure communications using a computer system, the software product comprising:message interface software configured to direct the computer system to transfer messages between Graphical User Interface (GUI) software and security software and between the GUI software and transport software, to provide the GUI software with language-neutral method calls to the security software, to insert first security associations into the messages transferred from the computer system, to extract second security associations from the messages received by the computer system, and to transfer the second security associations for authentication by a security system; anda storage media that stores the message interface software.2. The software product of claim 1 wherein the message interface software is configured to direct the computer system to store information indicating ports, Internet addresses, and object identifiers for software objects.3. The software product of claim 1 wherein the message interface software is configured to direct the computer system to implement an Interface Description Language (IDL).4. The software product of claim 1 wherein the message interface software is configured to direct the computer system to implement Microsoft DCOM.5. The software product of claim 1 wherein a portion of the messages are CORBA exception messages.6. The software product of claim 1 further comprising the transport software configured to direct the computer system to transfer the messages between the message interface software and a communication network, to insert the first security associations into the messages transferred from computer system, and to extract the second security associations from the messages received by the computer system, and transfer the second security associations for authentication by a security system, and wherein the storage media stores the transport software.7. The software product of claim 6 wherein the message interface software is configured to direct the computer system to insert a first portion of the first security associations into the messages transferred from the computer system, and wherein the transport software is configured to direct the computer system to insert a second portion of the first security associations into the messages transferred from computer system.8. The software product of claim 6 wherein the GUI software is configured to direct the computer system to provide Internet access and the transport software is configured to direct the computer system to implement an Internet Protocol.9. The software product of claim 1 further comprising the security software configured to direct the computer system to receive a password from the GUI software through the message interface, decrypt a private key with the password, encrypt a result with the private key, and transfer the encrypted result for authentication by the security system, and wherein the storage media stores the security software.10. The software product of claim 1 wherein the GUI software is configured to direct the computer system to provide an employee with access to an employer communication network over the Internet.11. The software product of claim 1 wherein the GUI software is configured to direct the computer system to provide a customer with access to a service over the Internet.12. The software product of claim 1 wherein the GUI software is configured to direct the computer system to provide a network customer with access to a communication network manager over the Internet.13. A method of operating a computer system for secure communications, the method comprising:transferring messages through a message interface between a Graphical User Interface (GUI) and a security process and between the GUI and a transport interface;in the message interface, providing the GUI software with language-neutral method calls to the security software;in the message interface, inserting first security associations into the messages transferred from the computer system;in the message interface, extracting second security associations from the messages received by the computer system; andtransferring the second security associations from the message interface for authentication by a security system.14. The method of claim 13 wherein providing the GUI with the language-neutral method calls to the security process comprises storing information indicating ports, Internet addresses, and object identifiers for software objects.15. The method of claim 13 wherein providing the GUI with the language-neutral method calls to the security process comprises implementing an Interface Description Language (IDL).16. The method of claim 13 wherein providing the GUI with the language-neutral method calls to the security process comprises implementing Microsoft DCOM.17. The method of claim 13 wherein a portion of the messages are CORBA exception messages.18. The method of claim 13 further comprising:transferring the messages through the transport interface between the message interface and a communication network;in the transport interface, inserting the first security associations into the messages transferred from computer system;in the transport interface, extracting the second security associations from the messages received by the computer system; andtransferring the second security associations from the transport interface for authentication by a security system.19. The method of claim 18 wherein inserting the first security associations into the messages transferred from the computer system comprises:in the message interface, inserting a first portion of the first security associations into the messages transferred from the computer system; andin the transport interface, inserting a second portion of the first security associations into the messages transferred from computer system.20. The method of claim 18 wherein transferring the messages through the message interface and the transport interface between the GUI and the communication network comprises providing Internet access using an Internet Protocol.21. The method of claim 13 further comprising:in the security process, receiving a password from the GUI through the message interface;in the security process, decrypting a private key with the password;in the security process, encrypting a result with the private key; andtransferring the encrypted result from the security process for authentication by the security system.22. The method of claim 13 wherein the GUI is configured to provide an employee with access to an employer communication network over the Internet.23. The method of claim 13 wherein the GUI is configured to provide a customer with access to a service over the Internet.24. The method of claim 13 wherein the GUI is configured to provide a network customer with access to a communication network manager over the Internet.25. A communication system comprising:a session manager configured to exchange network control messages with user systems, process the network control messages to control communication services for the user systems, insert first security associations in two different layers of the network control messages transferred to the user systems, extract second security associations from the two different layers of the network control messages received from the user systems; anda security system configured to exchange security messages with the user systems to authenticate the user systems, and to process the second security associations to authenticate the network control messages received from the user systems.26. The communication system of claim 25 wherein one of the layers comprises a network transport layer.27. The communication system of claim 25 wherein one of the layers comprises a language-neutral message interface layer.28. The communication system of claim 25 wherein one of the layers comprises an Internet Protocol layer.29. The communication system of claim 25 wherein one of the layers comprises a Microsoft DCOM layer.30. The communication system of claim 25 wherein one of the layers comprises a CORBA layer.31. The communication system of claim 25 wherein the security system is configured to generate the first security associations and the second security associations.32. A method of operating a communication system, the method comprising:exchanging security messages with user systems to authenticate the user systems;exchanging network control messages with user systems and processing the network control messages to control communication services for the user systems;inserting first security associations in two different layers of the network control messages transferred to the user systems;extracting second security associations from the two different layers of the network control messages received from the user systems; andprocessing the second security associations to authenticate the network control messages received from the user systems.33. The method of claim 32 wherein one of the layers comprises a network transport layer.34. The method of claim 32 wherein one of the layers comprises a language-neutral message interface layer.35. The method of claim 32 wherein one of the layers comprises an Internet Protocol layer.36. The method of claim 32 wherein one of the layers comprises a Microsoft DCOM layer.37. The method of claim 32 wherein one of the layers comprises a CORBA layer.38. The method of claim 32 further comprising generating the first security associations and the second security associations.
RELATED APPLICATIONS
This application is a continuation of prior application Ser. No. 09/179,477, filed on Oct. 27, 1998, now issued as U.S. Pat. No. 6,330,677, and that is herein incorporated by reference into this application.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
1. Field of the Invention
The invention is related to the field of security systems, and in particular, to an object-based security system for computing and communications systems.
2. Statement of the Problem
Computer and communication system security has become of paramount importance with the increase in the use of such systems across all aspects of industry. Numerous security tools are available for these systems, but unfortunately, the current tools exhibit numerous shortcomings.
Current security products are designed to work as a single integrated package with their own feature set. If an improved security feature is made available in a different product, then the user must wait for their product to include the new feature or buy the other product. There is a need for security products to be abstracted behind a client interface so security features can be upgraded without replacing the security system.
Current security products are also difficult for application programmers to design to. For example, the programmer designing communications software for a personal computer must understand all of the messaging and interaction required to interface with the security product. There is a need for security products that offer simple interfaces to application software developers.
Current security products typically apply security at a single communications layer. There is a need for security tools that apply security at multiple layers of inter-processor communications.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
The invention solves the above problems with methods and software products that authenticate processes and inter-process messaging in computer or communications systems. Some examples of the invention operate as follows in an environment comprised of a first computer system, a second computer system, and a security system. In the first computer system, a process transfers a log-in request to a security object. The security object transfers a request to authenticate the process to the security system. The security system authenticates the process and generates a security association. In some versions of the invention, the security association is a random number. The security system stores the security association and transfers the security association to the security object in the first computer system.
In the first computer system, the security object transfers the security association to the middleware. The middleware subsequently receives a message from the process for transfer to the second computer system. The middleware inserts the security association into the message and transfers the message to the middleware in the second computer system.
In some examples of the invention, the security object in the first computer system transfers the security association to a transport layer in the first computer system. The transport layer receives the message from the middleware in the first computer system for transfer to the second computer system. The transport layer inserts the security association into the message and transfers the message to the transport layer in the second computer system. In the second computer system, the transport layer extracts the security association from the message and transfers the security association to the security system. The security system checks the security association extracted from the message with the stored security association to authenticate the message.
Some examples of the invention include software products. One software product comprises security software and middleware software stored on a software storage medium. The security software directs a processor to receive a log-in request for a process, generate a request to authenticate the process, transfer the request to authenticate the process, receive a security association for the process, and transfer the security association. The middleware software directs the processor to receive the security association from the security software, receive a message from the process, insert the security association into the message, and transfer the message.
Another software product comprises security software stored on a software storage medium. The security software directs a processor to receive a request to authenticate a process, authenticate the process, generate a security association for the process, store the security association, transfer the security association, receive the security association extracted from a message, and check the security association extracted from the message with the stored security association to authenticate the message.
The invention authenticates processes and inter-process messaging. The processes could be in an end-user's computer to provide access to a network. The processes could also be in a network system without any end-user. In some examples of the invention, security is performed in three layers—the application layer, the middleware layer, and the transport layer. The three layers of security provide a highly secure environment.
One advantage of the security system is the ease with which processes can be developed and installed for use within a highly secured environment. The programmer need only design their process to provide a password to a local security object. The use of middleware provides an easy message interface to the programmer for this purpose. The security objects and middleware then handle the authentication of both the process and messages sent and received by the process. System users and devices only need the relatively thin client security objects, middleware, and transport software to operate in a highly secured environment.
The local security objects also provide a thin client interface to a robust security toolkit. The security features are abstracted behind the client interface and can be conveniently updated for a user without changing out the user's security system. Thus, the user is provided a true choice of advanced in security technologies.
DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
FIG. 1
is system-level block diagram of an example of the invention.
FIG. 2
is a flow diagram of system operation in an example of the invention.
FIG. 3
is a flow diagram of system operation in an example of the invention.
FIG. 4
is a flow diagram of system operation in an example of the invention.
FIG. 5
is a flow diagram of system operation in an example of the invention.
FIG. 6
is a flow diagram of system operation in an example of the invention.
FIG. 7
is a flow diagram of system operation in an example of the invention.
FIG. 8
is a flow diagram of system operation in an example of the invention.
FIG. 9
is a flow diagram of system operation in an example of the invention.
FIG. 10
is a flow diagram of system operation in an example of the invention.
FIG. 11
is system-level block diagram of a communications system in an example of the invention.
FIG. 12
is block diagram of a user system in an example of the invention.
FIG. 13
is detailed block diagram of a user system in an example of the invention.
FIG. 14
is block diagram of a communications service node in an example of the invention.
FIG. 15
is block diagram of a session manager in an example of the invention.
FIG. 16
is block diagram of a security system in an example of the invention.
FIG. 17
is block diagram of a service system in an example of the invention.
FIG. 18
is a flow diagram of communications system operation in an example of the invention.
FIG. 19
is a flow diagram of communications system operation in an example of the invention.
FIG. 20
is a flow diagram of communications system operation in an example of the invention.
FIG. 21
is a flow diagram of communications system operation in an example of the invention.
FIG. 22
is a flow diagram of communications system operation in an example of the invention.
FIG. 23
is a process diagram of communications system operation in an example of the invention.
FIG. 24
is a process diagram of communications system operation in an example of the invention.
FIG. 25
is a process diagram of communications system operation in an example of the invention.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
General Configuration and Operation—
FIGS. 1-10
FIG. 1
depicts a first system
100
connected to a second system
110
. The second system
110
is connected to a security system
120
. The first system
100
comprises a process
102
, security object
104
, middleware
106
, and transport
108
. The second system
110
comprises a process
112
, security object
114
, middleware
116
, and transport
118
. The security system
120
comprises security objects
124
, middleware
126
, and transport
128
.
The processes
102
and
112
represent any type of software application that communicates with other processes through middleware. Some examples of processes
102
and
112
include graphical user interfaces, communications provider agents, communications user agents, client software, and server software. The processes
102
and
112
are typically written in languages such as Java, C, C++, and Small Talk, although other languages could also be used.
The security objects
104
,
114
, and
124
represent software that authenticates the processes
102
and
112
and their respective messaging. Although security object
104
and security object
114
are referred to in the singular, they could be comprised of multiple objects. The security objects
124
contain additional logic not required in security objects
104
and
114
. The security objects
104
,
114
, and
124
are written in object-oriented languages such as C++ and Small Talk, although other languages could also be used.
The middleware
106
,
116
, and
126
represents any software interface between the processes
102
and
112
. Some examples of middleware
106
,
116
, and
126
include Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) and the Microsoft Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). Under the control of the security objects
104
,
114
, and
124
the middleware
106
,
116
, and
126
is operational to insert and extract security information within inter-process messages.
The transport
108
,
118
, and
128
represent a transport layer that is capable of supporting inter-process communications through the middleware
106
,
116
, and
126
. Some examples of transport
108
,
118
, and
128
include Transaction Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) and Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM).
The above-described elements are comprised of software that is stored on storage media accessible by processors in the respective systems. Some examples of storage media are memory devices, tape, disks, integrated circuits, and servers. The software is operational when executed by the processors to direct the processor to operate in accord with the invention. The term “processor” refers to a single processing device or a group of inter-operational processing devices. Some examples of processors are computers, integrated circuits, and logic circuitry. Those skilled in the art are familiar with software, processors, and storage media.
FIGS. 2-10
illustrate the operation of the systems
100
,
110
,
120
. The operation starts on
FIG. 2
where the security objects
124
generate a public/private key pair for the user ID representing the process
112
in step
200
. The security objects
124
store the public key and user ID for the process
112
in step
202
. The security objects
124
provide the private key and user ID for distribution to the system
110
in step
204
through a trusted method, such as certified mail or secure communications link. If desired, the security object
114
could first be programmed with the user ID and private key for process
112
and then to distributed to the system
110
through a trusted method for installation by the end-user.
The security object
114
obtains a password from the process
112
through the middleware
116
in step
206
. The security object
114
encrypts the private key for the process
112
with the password in step
208
. The private key is stored in an encrypted version. The password may be entered by an end-user, so the end-user can prevent unauthorized access by not storing, writing down, or sharing their password. If an end-user is not available during log-in to supply a password, then the password can be placed in a file for the security object
114
to read upon initialization.
The process
112
logs-in by transferring its password to the security object
114
through the middleware
116
in step
210
. The security object
114
uses the password to decrypt the private key for the process
112
in step
212
. The security object
114
generates a random number and processes it with a mathematical function to generate a result in step
214
. The security object
114
encrypts the result with the private key for the process
112
in step
216
. The security object
114
transfers the user ID, random number, and encrypted result to the security objects
124
in step
218
through the middleware
116
, transport
118
, transport
128
, and middleware
126
.
The security objects
124
process the random number with the same mathematical function to generate the same result in step
220
. The security objects
124
retrieve the public key for the user ID and use the public key to decrypt the encrypted result in step
222
. In step
224
, the security objects
124
compare the decrypted result with the result generated from the random number. If the two results do not match in step
226
, then the user ID is not authenticated and an alarm is sent to security system
120
administration in step
228
. If the two results match in step
226
, then the user ID for the process
112
is authenticated in step
230
.
After authentication, the security objects
124
generate a security association for use by the authentic user ID in step
232
. The security association is typically a random number. The security objects
124
encrypt the security association with the public key for the authenticated user ID in step
234
. The security objects
124
transfer the security association to the security object
114
in step
236
through the middleware
126
, transport
128
, transport
118
, and middleware
116
. The security object
114
decrypts and transfers the security association to the middleware
116
in step
238
for insertion in messages from the process
112
.
The security objects
124
generate a public/private key pair for the user ID representing the process
102
in step
240
. The security objects
124
store the public key and user ID for the process
102
in step
242
and provide the private key and user ID for distribution to the system
100
in step
244
through a trusted method, such as certified mail or secure communications link. The security object
104
obtains a password from the process
102
through the middleware
106
in step
246
. The security object
104
encrypts the private key for the process
102
with the password in step
248
.
The process
102
logs-in by transferring its password to the security object
104
through the middleware
106
in step
250
. The security object
104
uses the password to decrypt the private key for the process
102
in step
252
. The security object
104
generates a random number and processes it with a mathematical function to generate a result in step
258
. The security object
104
encrypts the result with the private key for the process
102
in step
260
. The security object
104
transfers the user ID, random number, and encrypted result to the security objects
124
in step
262
through the middleware
106
, transport
108
, transport
118
, transport
128
, and middleware
126
.
The security objects
124
process the random number with the same mathematical function to generate the result in step
264
. The security objects
124
retrieve the public key for the user ID and use the public to decrypt the encrypted result in step
266
. The security objects
124
compare the decrypted result with the result generated from the random number in step
268
. If the two results do not match in step
270
, then the user ID is not authenticated and an alarm is sent to security system
120
administration in step
272
. If the two results match in step
270
, then the user ID for the process
102
is authenticated in step
274
.
After authentication, the security objects
124
generate a security association for use by the authenticated user ID in step
276
. The security objects
124
encrypt the security association with the public key for the authenticated user ID in step
278
. The security objects
124
transfer the security association to the security object
104
in step
280
through the middleware
126
, transport
128
, transport
118
, transport
108
, and middleware
106
. The security object
104
decrypts the security association and transfers the security association to the middleware
106
in step
282
for insertion in messages from process
102
.
The process
102
transfers a message for the process
112
to the middleware
106
in step
284
. The middleware
106
places the user ID and security association for the process
102
in the message and transfers the message to the middleware
116
through transport
108
and
118
in step
286
. The middleware
116
extracts the user ID and security association from the message and forwards the user ID and security association to security objects
124
in step
288
through transport
118
, transport
128
, and middleware
126
. The security objects
124
retrieve the stored security association with the user ID and compare it to the security association received from the middleware
116
in step
290
. If the security associations do not match in step
292
, then the message from the process
102
is not authentic, and an alarm is sent to security system
120
administration in step
294
. If the two security associations match in step
292
, then the message from the process
102
is authenticated in step
296
.
The process
112
transfers a message for the process
102
to the middleware
116
in step
298
. The middleware
116
places the user ID and security association for the process
112
in the message and transfers the message to the middleware
106
through transport
118
and
108
in step
300
. The middleware
106
extracts the user ID and security association from the message and forwards the user ID and security association to security objects
124
in step
302
through transport
108
, transport
118
, transport
128
, and middleware
126
. The security objects
124
retrieve the stored security association with the user ID and compare it to the security association received from the middleware
106
in step
304
. If the security associations do not match in step
306
, then the message from the process
112
is not authentic, and an alarm is sent to security system
120
administration in step
308
. If the two security associations match in step
306
, then the message from the process
112
is authenticated in step
310
.
In some embodiments of the invention, the transport layers
108
,
118
, and
128
can be configured to add additional security by adding a unique code to the messaging. For example, the security object
104
could provide the first eight bits of the security association for the process
102
to the transport
108
to place in the messaging from process
102
. If the transport
108
is ATM, the eight-bit security association could be placed in the first octet of the ATM cell payload. Likewise, the security object
114
could provide the first eight bits of the security association for the process
112
to the transport
118
to place in the messaging from process
112
. If the transport
108
and
118
are ATM, then the eight-bit security association could be placed in the first octet of the ATM cell payload. Transport
108
and
118
would then extract the 8-bit security associations and sender user IDs from received messages and forward them to the security objects
124
for authentication in a similar fashion as described above for the ORB layer.
In these embodiments, security is performed in three layers. The first layer is the application layer—the processes and objects—with password and process authentication. The second layer is the middleware layer with message authentication using security associations. The third layer is the transport layer with message authentication using security associations. The three layers of security provide a highly secure environment.
It should be appreciated that multiple processes could be resident within a given system and use the same security object. Each process could have its own password, user ID, and public/private keys, or various processes could share these items. A process could be invoked by a person or operate without human invocation. For example, the process could be communications software used by a person to access a network. In this case, the person could simply remember and enter the password into the process to log-in to the network. The process would then transfer the password and user ID to the security object for authentication by the security system. In another example, the process could reside in a network element, such as a server. The server could respond to various client requests without human intervention. In this other example, a security file in the server would be programmed with the password for retrieval by the security object.
One advantage of the security system is the ease with which processes can be developed and installed for use within a highly secured environment. The programmer need only design their process to provide a password to a local security object. The use of middleware provides an easy message interface to the programmer for this purpose. The security objects and middleware then handle the authentication of both the process and messages sent and received by the process. System users and devices only need the relatively thin client security objects, middleware, and transport software to operate in a highly secured environment.
Communications System Security Configuration—
FIGS. 11-15
FIGS. 11-16
depict a detailed configuration for a specific implementation of the invention with respect to an advanced communications system, but the invention is not restricted to the specific implementation provided below. If desired, various features in this implementation could be incorporated into the configuration and operation described above.
FIG. 11
depicts a user
1100
and a service
1170
connected to a service node
1120
. The service node
1120
includes network systems
1121
and security system
1122
. The user
1100
communicates with the service
1170
through the network systems
1121
in the service node
1120
. Security objects
1104
,
1123
, and
1171
are respectively included in the user
1100
, network systems
1121
, and service
1170
. Network systems
1121
comprise individual systems that each have their own set of security objects
1123
.
The security system
1122
in the service node
1120
works with the security objects
1104
,
1123
, and
1171
to provide authentic communications between the user
1100
, network systems
1121
, and the service
1170
. For security purposes, the service
1170
is configured and operates much like the user
1100
, except that the respective internal processes are different. For example, the user
1100
might represent an employee working at home on a personal computer using client processes, and the service
1170
might represent an office network with a server using server processes.
FIG. 12
depicts the user
1100
. The user
1100
comprises a personal computer configured with software. The software includes Graphical User Interface (GUI)
1101
, provider agent
1102
, operating system
1103
, security objects
1104
, Object Request Broker (ORB)
1105
, and TCP/IP interface
1106
.
The GUI
1101
is a client process similar to the process
102
of FIG.
1
. The GUI
1101
provides the user with screens that prompt the user with communications service options. For example, the user may select a button to access the service
1170
. The GUI
1101
is configured to store a user ID and collect a password from the end-user. The GUI
1101
is also configured to send a log-in message with the user ID and password to the security objects
1104
through the ORB
1105
.
The provider agent
1102
is a client process similar to the process
102
of FIG.
1
. The provider agent
1102
is based on the Telecommunications Information Network Architecture Consortium (TINA-C) and is known in the art. The provider agent
1102
manages communications sessions established through the service node
1120
. The provider agent
1102
is the “local agent” for the service node
1120
in the user
1100
computer. The provider agent
1102
obtains a user ID and password from the GUI
1101
. The provider agent
1102
is also configured to send a log-in message with the user ID and password to the security objects
1104
through the ORB
1105
.
The operating system
1104
could be any software program to facilitate the execution of software on the user
1100
computer. One example is the Windows operating system provided by Microsoft of Redmond, Wash.
The ORB
1105
is a CORBA software interface that provides a language-neutral message exchange between client and server objects. Essentially, CORBA allows an object to expose and call methods of another object without regard to the location or programming language of the other object. The ORB
1105
is a version of the middleware
106
on FIG.
1
.
A key aspect of CORBA is the use of a text-based Interface Description Language (IDL) to specify client and server object interfaces. The programmer specifies methods for the server object in an IDL text file that is compiled into client and server “stubs” based on the respective languages of the client and server objects. A client object uses the client stub to access the ORB
1105
, and the server object uses the server stub to access the ORB
1105
. Thus, communications from a client object to a server object pass through the client stub, ORB, and server stub. The use of CORBA allows the designer of the server object to define a language-neutral message set.
The ORB
1105
is configured to accept a user ID and security association from the security objects
1104
. An interceptor within the ORB
1105
inserts the user ID and security association in the security context of the CORBA message wrapper for messages from that user ID. An interceptor also extracts the user ID and security association from the security context in incoming messages and forwards the user ID and security association to the security system
1122
. Those skilled in the art are familiar with CORBA and ORBs that could be adapted to support the invention.
Security at the ORB layer is advantageous because CORBA exception messages currently have no security. If false exception messages are received from an impostor, typical CORBA functionality would process these false exceptions messages and degrade system performance to the point of a crash. The use of the security association eliminates the problem of non-secure exception messages.
The TCP/IP interface
1106
could be any software able to provide the user
1100
with communications functionality based on the TCP/IP Protocol. The TCP/IP interface
1106
is a version of the transport
108
in FIG.
1
. The TCP/IP interface
1106
is configured to accept a user ID and security association from the security objects
1104
. The TCP/IP interface
1106
inserts the user ID and security association in the IP message wrapper for messages from that user ID. The TCP/IP interface
1106
also extracts the user ID and security association from incoming messages and forwards user ID and security association to the security system
1122
.
FIG. 13
depicts a detailed version of a portion of the user
1100
. The security objects
1104
comprise security files
1107
, crypto agent
1108
, certification agent
1109
, and security abstraction layer
1110
. The ORB
1105
comprises pre-marshall interceptor
1111
, marshalling
1112
, and post-marshall interceptor
1113
.
The security files
1107
contain initialization data for the crypto agent
1108
and the certification agent
1109
. Initialization data might include information such as root directories and interface object reference file locations.
The crypto agent
1108
and the certification agent
1109
are IDL interfaces to the security abstraction layer
1110
. The agents
1108
and
1109
provide a client IDL stub for the GUI
1101
and the provider agent
1102
. The agents
1108
and
1109
provide a server IDL stub for the security abstraction layer
1110
. The crypto agent
1108
includes methods to the encryption algorithm objects in the security abstraction layer
1110
. The certification agent
1109
includes methods to the certificate management in the security abstraction layer
1110
.
The security abstraction layer
1110
is based on the RSA library of security functions provided by RSA, Inc. The security functions include encryption, authentication, authorization, profile management, symmetric key generation, policy management, delegation, quality of service, and auditing. The RSA library is enclosed in a C++ wrapper that is accessed through the agent
1108
, ORB
1105
, and agent
1109
. Those skilled in the art are familiar with the RSA library and these security functions.
It should be appreciated that the security abstraction layer
1110
is independent from the processes and objects that access it. This reduces the complexity of design since programmers may design processes and security objects that access the security abstraction layer
1110
through the IDL interfaces provided by the agents
1108
and
1109
. Likewise, the security abstraction layer
1110
can be designed independently of these objects and processes because of the CORBA interface. For example, the current encryption algorithm, PKCS#5, could be upgraded through new security abstraction layer software without requiring new client training, applications, or software.
The ORB
1105
exchanges messages with GUI interface
1101
, provider agent
1102
, TCP/IP interface
1106
, and certification agent
1109
. A primary function of the ORB
1105
is marshalling
1112
where CORBA wrappers are added to and removed from messages. The CORBA wrappers include a security context field where security information is transmitted with each message. The pre-marshall interceptor
1111
processes messages before marshalling occurs, and the post-marshall interceptor
1113
processes messages after marshalling occurs. Either the pre-marshall interceptor
1111
or the post-marshall interceptor
1113
can insert values in the security context field of a CORBA message. The certification agent
1109
specifies the inserted values, typically a user ID and security association, to the ORB
1105
. Either the pre-marshall interceptor
1111
or the post-marshall interceptor
1113
can extract values from the security context field of a CORBA message. The extracted values, typically the user ID and security association, are sent to the security system
1122
for message authentication.
If desired, the TCP/IP interface
1106
can also be configured to insert and extract security values in the TCP/IP wrapper. The certification agent
1109
specifies the inserted values, typically a user ID and security association, to the TCP/IP interface
1106
. The extracted values, typically the user ID and security association, are sent to the security system
1122
for message authentication.
FIG. 14
depicts the service node
1120
comprising the network systems
1121
and the security system
1122
. The network systems
1121
comprise: session manager
1125
, trader
1126
, ATM switch
1127
, connection manager
1128
, connection performer
1129
, IP router
1130
, map
1131
, GUI server
1132
, and firewall
1133
. The session manager
1125
is a TINA-C component that manages user communications sessions. For example, the session manager
1125
contains a user agent that interacts with the provider agent
1102
of the user
1100
to determine the end points for a communications session. The trader
1126
is a directory service for the object-oriented service node environment. The ATM switch
1127
establishes virtual communications paths under the control of the connection manager
1128
. The connection manager
1128
is a TINA-C component that receives communications requirements from the session manager
1125
and directs the ATM switch
1127
to establish the appropriate virtual connections. The connection performer
1129
monitors the performance of the ATM connections. The IP router
1130
provides intranet services and a gateway to external IP systems. The map
1131
provides graphical displays of the topography of the network and particular user configurations. The GUI server
1132
interacts with the GUI
1101
at the user
1100
to provide menu screens and collect user information. The GUI server
1132
also stores an Information Object Representation (IOR) for the objects. The IOR specifies the physical address of the object by IP address, port number, and object ID, and can be accessed by other objects from the GUI server
1132
. The firewall
1133
protects the service node
1120
on connections to external IP systems.
FIG. 15
depicts a detailed version of a portion of the session manager
1125
. The session manager
1125
comprises security objects
1123
, user agent
1140
, ORB
1141
, and TCP/IP interface
1145
. The security objects
1123
comprise security files
1135
, crypto agent
1136
, certification agent
1137
, and security abstraction layer
1138
. The ORB
1141
comprises pre-marshall interceptor
1142
, marshalling
1143
, and post-marshall interceptor
1144
. The user agent
1140
is a TINA-C component that works with the provider agent
1102
to establish and manage communications sessions. The remaining elements on
FIG. 15
are similar to those described for the user
1100
.
FIG. 16
depicts the security system
1122
. The security system
1122
could reside on a conventional server or group of inter-operating servers. The security system
1114
comprises: certificate authority
1150
, authenticator
1151
, user agent
1152
, security components
1153
, secure LDAP
1154
, security files
1155
, crypto agent
1156
, certification agent
1157
, ORB
1158
, object database
1159
, operating system
1160
, and TCP/IP interface
1161
. The certificate authority
1150
generates and verifies certificates for user IDs that bind a public key to a user ID. The certificate authority
1150
provides the certificates to requesting security objects. The authenticator
1151
exchanges data with certification agents to authenticate user IDs. The user agent
1152
receives security data from ORB interceptors to authenticate messages. The secure components
1153
form the security system
1122
interface to the trader
1126
. The secure LDAP
1154
is the security system
1122
interface to X.500 based systems that request public keys. The security files
1155
, crypto agent
1156
, certification agent
1157
, ORB
1158
, and TCP/IP interface
1161
are similar to those elements described for the user
1100
. The object database
1159
is advantageous because changes to a class are automatically reflected across all of the objects in the class. The operating system
1160
is Windows NT provided by Microsoft of Redmond, Wash. A security abstraction layer similar to the security abstraction layer
1110
is included in each of the elements
1150
-
1154
.
FIG. 17
depicts a detailed version of a portion of the service
1170
. The service
1170
comprises security objects
1171
, provider agent
1172
, ORB
1173
, and TCP/IP interface
1174
. The security objects
1171
comprise security files
1175
, crypto agent
1176
, certification agent
1177
, and security abstraction layer
1178
. The ORB
1173
comprises pre-marshall interceptor
1179
, marshalling
1180
, and post-marshall interceptor
1181
. The provider agent
1172
is a TINA-C component that works with the user agent
1140
to establish and manage communications sessions. The remaining elements on
FIG. 17
are similar to those described for the user
1110
.
Communications System Security Initialization—
FIGS. 18-22
FIGS. 18-22
depict the security initialization for the user
1100
, service node
1120
, and service
1170
. Initialization starts on
FIG. 18
where the crypto agent
1156
and certification agent
1157
in the security system
1122
read their respective configuration information from the security files
1155
in step
1800
. The crypto agent
1156
and certification agent
1157
initialize the ORB
1158
in step
1802
. In step
1804
, the crypto agent
1156
and certification agent
1157
create instances of their respective objects and store their IORs in the IOR file specified the configuration information.
The certificate authority
1150
reads its configuration information from the security files
1155
in step
1806
. The certificate authority
1150
initializes the ORB
1158
in step
1808
. The certificate authority
1150
creates an instance of the certificate authority
1150
object and stores its IOR in the IOR file specified in the configuration information in step
1810
. The certificate authority
1150
checks for its certificate in the object database
1159
in step
1812
. Since there is not yet a certificate for the certificate authority
1150
in the object database
1159
, the certificate authority
1150
generates a key pair in step
1814
. The certificate authority
1150
encrypts the private key in step
1816
with a password obtained from the configuration file. The certificate authority
1150
issues a certificate for itself and signs certificate with its private key in step
1818
. The certificate authority
1150
stores the certificate in the object database
1159
in step
1820
.
The authenticator
1151
, user agent
1152
, secure components
1153
, and secure LDAP
1154
initialize in the same way and are each referred to in this paragraph as “security system object”. The security system object reads its configuration information from the security files
1155
in step
1822
. The security system object initializes the ORB
1158
in step
1824
. The security system object creates a new instance of the security system object in step
1826
. The security system object requests its certificate from the certification agent
1157
in step
1828
. The certification agent
1157
forwards the request to the certificate authority
1150
in step
1830
. The certificate authority
1150
checks for the certificate in the object database
1159
in step
1832
. Since there is not yet a certificate for the security system object in the object database
1159
, the certificate authority
1151
responds negatively to the certification agent
1157
in step
1834
. The certification agent
1157
forwards the negative response to the security system object in step
1836
. With no certificate, the security system object generates a key pair in step
1838
. The security system object encrypts the private key in step
1840
with a password obtained from the configuration information. The security system object builds a certificate request including its user ID and public key in step
1842
. The security system object sends the certificate request to the certification agent
1157
in step
1844
. The certification agent
1157
forwards the certificate request to the certificate authority
1150
in step
1846
. The certificate authority
1150
issues a certificate for the security system object and signs the certificate with its own private key in step
1848
. The certificate authority
1150
stores a copy of the new certificate in the object database
1159
in step
1850
. The certificate authority also transfers the certificate to the certification agent
1157
in step
1852
. The certification agent
1157
forwards the certificate to the security system object in step
1854
. The security system object stores its IOR in the IOR file specified the configuration information in step
1856
.
To initialize the user
1100
, the crypto agent
1108
and certification agent
1109
read their respective configuration information from the security files
1107
in step
1858
. The crypto agent
1108
and certification agent
1109
initialize the ORB
1105
in step
1860
. The crypto agent
1108
and certification agent
1109
create instances of their respective objects and store their IORs in the IOR file specified in the configuration information in step
1862
.
To initialize the session manager
1125
, the crypto agent
1136
and certification agent
1137
read their respective configuration information from the security files
1135
in step
1864
. The crypto agent
1136
and certification agent
1137
initialize the ORB
1141
in step
1866
. The crypto agent
1136
and certification agent
1137
create instances of their respective objects and store their IORs in the IOR file specified in the configuration information in step
1868
. Other network systems
1121
would initialize in a similar manner.
To initialize the service
1170
, the crypto agent
1176
and certification agent
1177
read their respective configuration information from the security files
1175
in step
1870
. The crypto agent
1176
and certification agent
1177
initialize the ORB
1173
in step
1872
. The crypto agent
1176
and certification agent
1177
create instances of their respective objects and store their IORs in the IOR file specified in the configuration information in step
1874
.
The processes in the user
1100
, network systems
1121
, and service
1170
must obtain certificates to operate within the communications system. For example, the provider agent
1102
will need a certificate that binds its user ID and public key within the security system
1122
. The user agent
1140
and the provider agent
1172
will also require certificates. The security system
1114
issues these certificates using the certificate authority
1150
.
When a process requests a certificate through its local certification agent in step
1876
, the certificate authority
1150
generates a key pair for the user ID of the process in step
1878
. The certificate authority
1150
issues a certificate containing the user ID and public key for the process and signs the certificate with its own private key in step
1880
. The certificate authority
1150
stores a copy of the certificate in the object database
1159
in step
1882
and transfers the certificate to the certification agent for the process in step
1884
. The public key can be made available to the public domain through the secure LDAP
1154
. The private key is distributed to the owner of the process through a trusted method in step
1886
, such as certified mail or secure communications link. If desired, the certification agent for the process could first be programmed with the user ID and private key and then the certification agent could be distributed to the end-user through a trusted method for installation. The certification agent for the process obtains a password from the process and uses the crypto agent to encrypt the private key for the process with the password in step
1888
.
It should be appreciated that the security system is now ready to operate. The pertinent security objects and processes all store password-encrypted private keys and have registered certificates with the security system that bind their user ID with their public key.
Communications System Security Operation—
FIGS. 23-25
FIG. 23
illustrates process authentication for the provider agent
1102
in the user
1100
. Other processes, such as the user agent
1140
in the session manager
1125
and the provider agent
1172
in the service
1170
, would be authenticated in a similar manner.
The provider agent
1102
logs-in to the certification agent
1109
by providing its user ID and password. This certification agent
1109
instructs the crypto agent
1108
to generate an authentication file. The crypto agent
1108
generates the authentication file. The authentication file includes the user ID, a random number, a random number digest, a date/time stamp, and a digital signature. The random number is typically 40 bytes long. The random number digest is generated by passing the random number through a one-way hash function, such as the MD-5 algorithm, and then by passing the hash function result through a mask to obtain a 16 byte value. The digital signature is created by first using the password to decrypt the private key, and then by encrypting the random number digest with the private key.
The certification agent
1109
logs-in to the security system
1122
by providing the authentication file to the authenticator
1151
. The authenticator
1151
instructs the certificate authority
1150
to verify the certificate for the user ID that is listed in the authentication file. The certificate authority
1150
requests the certificate for the user ID from the object database
1159
, and the object database
1159
provides the certificate to the certificate authority
1150
. The certificate authority
1150
verifies the certificate and forwards it to the authenticator
1151
.
The authenticator
1151
generates a security association as follows. The random number from the authentication file is re-digested with the same one-way hash function as that used by the crypto agent
1108
. The re-calculated digest is then compared to the digest from the authentication file for a match. If no match occurs, authentication fails and an alarm is sent to security system
1122
administration. The public key from the certificate is then used to decrypt the digital signature. The decrypted digital signature should be the same random number as the digest received in the authentication information and the digest re-calculated by the authenticator
1151
. If the digital signature does not match, authentication fails and an alarm is sent to security system
1122
administration.
If the random number digests all match, then the authenticator
1151
generates a security association for the user ID. The security association is a random number that the security system
1122
uses to authenticate messages from the user ID during the subsequent communications session. The authenticator
1151
transfers the security association to the user agent
1152
. The authenticator
1151
encrypts the security association with its own private key and sends the encrypted security association to the certification agent
1109
. The certification agent
1109
passes the encrypted security association to the crypto agent
1108
. The crypto agent
1108
uses the public key of the authenticator
1151
to decrypt the security association and return it to the certification agent
1109
.
FIG. 24
illustrates message authentication at the ORB level for the provider agent
1102
in the user
1100
. Other processes, such as the user agent
1140
in the session manager
1125
and the provider agent
1172
in the service
1170
, would have messages authenticated in a similar manner.
At the user
1100
, The certification agent
1109
transfers the user ID and security association to the ORB
1105
for subsequent insertion in messages from the provider agent
1102
. The provider agent
1102
subsequently transfers a message to the ORB
1105
for delivery to the user agent
1140
in the session manager
1125
. One of the interceptors
1179
or
1180
in the ORB
1105
inserts the user ID and security association in the security context of the CORBA wrapper for the message. The ORB
1105
then transfers the message to the ORB
1141
in the session manager
1125
. This transfer occurs through the TCP/IP interfaces
1106
and
1145
(not shown).
At the session manager
1125
, one of the interceptors
1142
or
1144
in the ORB
1140
extracts the user ID and security association from the security context in the message. The ORB
1140
then forwards the user ID and security association to the user agent
1152
in the security system
1122
for message authentication.
The user agent
1152
checks the security association from the ORB
1140
with the security association previously received from the authenticator
1151
for the user ID. If IS the security associations do not match, then the user agent
1152
sends an alarm to the security system
1122
administration. If desired, the user agent
1152
could transfer message back to the ORB
1141
blocking communications from that user ID. If the message is authentic, the orb
1141
transfers the message to the user agent
1140
.
FIG. 25
illustrates message authentication at the TCP/IP level for the provider agent
1102
in the user
1100
. Other processes, such as the user agent
1140
in the session manager
1125
and the provider agent
1172
in the service
1170
, would have messages authenticated in a similar manner.
At the user
1100
, the certification agent
1109
transfers the user ID and security association to the TCP/IP interface
1106
for subsequent insertion in messages from the provider agent
1102
. The provider agent
1102
subsequently transfers a message through the ORB
1105
(not shown) to the TCP/IP interface
1106
for delivery to the user agent
1140
in the session manager
1125
. The TCP/IP interface
1106
inserts the user ID and security association in the TCP/IP message envelope. The TCP/IP interface
1106
then transfers the message to the TCP/IP interface
1145
in the session manager
1125
.
At the session manager
1125
, the TCP/IP interface
1145
extracts the user ID and security association from the TCP/IP message envelope. The TCP/IP interface
1145
then forwards the user ID and security association to the user agent
1152
in the security system
1122
for message authentication.
The user agent
1152
checks the security association from the TCP/IP interface
1145
with the security association previously received from the authenticator
1151
for the user ID. If the security associations do not match, then the user agent
1152
sends an alarm to the security system
1122
administration. If desired, the user agent
1152
could transfer message back to the TCP/IP interface
1145
blocking communications from that user ID. If the message is authentic, the TCP/IP interface
1145
transfers the message to the user agent
1140
through the ORB
1141
(not shown).
Those skilled in the art will appreciate variations of the above-described embodiments that fall within the scope of the invention. As a result, the invention is not limited to the specific examples and illustrations discussed above, but only by the following claims and their equivalents.
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